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Abstract: This paper starts from the fact that women receive lower pensions than men on 
average, and considers policies to address that fact. Women typically have lower wages 
than men, a greater likelihood of part-time work and more career breaks, and thus 
generally a less complete contribution record. In addition, pension age may be lower for 
women and annuities may be priced using separate life tables for women. The paper looks 
at three strategic ameliorative policy directions: policies intended to increase the size and 
duration of women’s earnings and hence improve their contribution records; policies to 
redirect resources within the pension system, including for survivors and after divorce; and 
ways of boosting women’s pensions with resources from outside the pension system. 
Key words: Gender, Pension Wealth, Annuity Pricing 
JEL codes: J16, J32, H55  
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1. Introduction1 
Social policy aims to increase individual well-being along multiple dimensions: 
• Income security, through earning opportunities, insurance, consumption 
smoothing, and poverty relief; 
• The maintenance and improvement of physical and emotional health; and 
• Education and training for labor market activity and personal development. 
Family policy aims to promote the achievement of those objectives for all family members, 
and in a way that promotes gender equity. 
This paper considers how pensions can contribute to these aims. Specifically, it considers 
how pension design can contribute to policies about gender and family.2 To frame the 
issues it is helpful to go back to fundamentals, in particular labor market experience and 
pension design.  
1.1. Labor market experience 
In a contributory system, a person’s pension entitlement is generally determined by: 
• Total contributions by that individual each year, which depends on his/her 
hourly wage, w, and the number of hours in covered work, L; and 
• The individual’s contribution density, i.e., the number of years of paid work, 
N. 
Internationally, the empirical facts are that women fare less well than men on all these 
dimensions. On average, they have: 
• Lower wages than men (w lower); 
• A greater likelihood of part-time work (L lower). 
                                                     
1 This paper draws on Barr and Diamond (2008, 2010) and Barr (2012, 2013).  
2 For a parallel study, see Chłoń-Domińczak (2017). 
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• Shorter careers, inter alia, because of more career breaks (N lower).3 
1.2. Pension design  
The effect of the gender pay gap (a snapshot at a point in time) is compounded by women’s 
less-complete history of paid work, and may be further exacerbated by the way pensions 
are designed. For example: 
• Minimum pension age for women may be lower than for men.  
• Annuities may be priced using separate life tables for men and women. 
• The fraction of a couple’s pension that continues after the death of one 
spouse may not be enough to maintain the living standard of the other. Since 
women are more likely to survive their husbands than vice versa, the 
problem affects women disproportionately. 
• Indexation of pensions in payment that fails to protect replacement rates 
affects women more strongly given their longer life expectancy on average. 
Thus for reasons with roots both in labor markets and pension design, it is no accident that 
elderly poverty is greater among women than men. 
The system of fully funded individual accounts in Chile illustrates the problems of design 
that, in different combinations, arise in different pension plans. The system presents 
women with a quadruple whammy: 
• Lower pay on average;  
• More gaps in employment; note that in a defined contribution (DC) plan, 
missing contribution years are particularly costly when younger (i.e., when 
women are having children); 
• An earlier pension age;4 
                                                     
3 For a wide-ranging study of the gender wage gap, see Blau and Kahn (2017), and on Latin America, 
Amarante, Colacce, and Manzi (2017). 
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• The fact that it is legal for annuities to be priced using separate life tables for 
men and women.  
The first two result in women having a smaller accumulation on average than men, the last 
two that for a given accumulation a woman receives a lower pension than a man. 
1.3. Overview of income poverty 
In every country shown in Table 1.1, women experience a higher rate of elderly poverty; 
and in every country except Poland, older pensioners (disproportionately women) are at 
higher risk of elderly poverty than pensioners aged 65–75. 
                                                                                                                                                       
4 Note that many of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe have already equalized pension age or are on 
a path to do so. 
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Table 1.1: Income poverty rates by age, sex, and household type, selected 
countries, 2014 
(Percentage with incomes less than 50 percent of median household disposable 
income) 
  Older people (aged over 65) 
Whole 
populatio
n 
    By age By gender 
  
All 
65+ 
66-
75 
76+ 
Me
n 
Wome
n 
Australia 
25.
7 
23.
4 
29.
2 23.6 27.5 12.8 
Canada 9.0 8.5 9.9 6.7 11.0 12.6 
Chile 
16.
3 
16.
2 
16.
4 16.1 16.4 16.1 
Denmark 3.2 2.1 4.9 2.3 4.0 5.5 
Finland 5.2 2.9 8.5 3.2 6.8 6.3 
France 3.6 2.8 4.5 2.7 4.2 8.2 
Germany 9.5 8.4 
10.
3 6.8 11.5 9.5 
Greece 8.2 7.1 9.5 6.9 9.3 14.8 
Italy 9.3 8.9 9.7 6.7 11.2 13.7 
Japan 
19.
0 
17.
0 
21.
3 15.1 22.1 16.1 
Netherlands 3.7 2.5 5.5 3.4 3.9 7.9 
New Zealand 
10.
6 7.7 
15.
2 6.6 14.0 10.9 
Norway 4.3 2.2 7.3 1.9 6.3 8.1 
Poland 7.6 8.3 6.7 4.6 9.3 10.4 
Portugal 9.7 8.5 
11.
2 7.1 11.6 13.5 
Slovak Republic 3.8 3.3 4.8 1.9 4.9 8.7 
Spain 5.4 4.7 6.2 3.7 6.7 15.3 
Sweden 
10.
0 6.6 
15.
2 6.4 13.1 9.0 
Switzerland 
19.
4 
16.
3 
23.
8 16.6 21.8 9.9 
United 
Kingdom 
13.
8 
10.
4 
18.
5 11.1 16.0 10.9 
United States 
20.
9 
17.
6 
25.
7 17.2 23.9 16.8 
        
OECD 
12.
5 
10.
7 
13.
9 
8.7 13.6 11.5 
Source: OECD 2017 (Table 6.3). 
12 
The question this paper addresses is: what policies help to reduce the number of (mainly) 
women experiencing income poverty in old age?5 After some framing discussion in section 
2, the rest of the paper is organized around three strategic policy directions: 
• Increasing the size and duration of earnings (section 3); 
• Redirecting resources within the pension system, including for survivors and 
after divorce (section 4); and/or 
• Adding resources from outside the pension system (section 5). 
Section 6 sets out some general conclusions.  
2. Framing the issues  
2.1. Policy issues 
In thinking about pension design it is mistaken to base analysis entirely on a typical case. It 
is important to take account of diversity of living arrangements and of individual and family 
behavior. 
2.1.1. Living arrangements are diverse and do not remain static  
Some adults are single and live alone, others are single and share housing and other 
consumption, and others are married or in other recognized partnerships. Married couples 
differ in the extent to which they share resources. Some stay married until one of them 
dies, other marriages end in divorce after varying lengths of time, and many people remarry 
after a divorce or the death of a spouse.  
 
                                                     
5 The examples in this paper are frequently presented in terms of husband and wife, with the woman as the 
primary carer, but recognizing throughout that other types of partnerships flourish and that the man may be 
the primary carer. Examples also often assume that the woman has the lower earnings in a couple, again 
recognizing that this is far from always the case. 
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2.1.2. Tax and benefit rules can affect men and women differently  
Taxes and benefits affect the behavior of family members. That conclusion is inescapable – 
it is not possible to have a policy that does not affect incentives. As examples: 
• Marriage: Policy design can encourage or discourage marriage. Taxes may be 
higher or lower on two people if they remain single than if they marry. 
Similar issues arise with pensions, particularly for people considering 
marriage in middle age or later.  
• Consumption patterns: Consumption can differ depending on whether 
benefits are paid to the husband or the wife. Evidence suggests that if child 
benefits are paid to the mother, a greater fraction will be spent on children 
(Goode, Callender, and Lister 1996). Other evidence (e.g., Case and Deaton 
1998) suggests that the noncontributory old-age pension in South Africa 
provides family poverty relief via grandmothers. 
• Labor supply of men and women: Gender-neutral taxes have different effects 
on average because men and women have different labor supply elasticities.  
• Labor supply of mothers of young children: Policy design can encourage or 
discourage paid work, depending on the design of child care subsidies or 
income tax, the length of school hours, and the employment rules applicable 
to people with young children. Also relevant is the subsidized provision of 
pension credits for those caring for young children. 
2.1.3. Resulting questions  
These different impacts suggest a series of questions with both positive and normative 
aspects, the answers to many of which are outside the scope of this paper:  
• How should consumption be shared within the family?  
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• Should the earnings of husband and wife be taxed on an individual or family 
basis?  
• Are labor supply and caring decisions made on the individual or household 
level? 
• Should taxes and benefits encourage mothers with young children to accept 
paid work or discourage them from doing so?  
• If policy is intended to encourage mothers with caring responsibilities to take 
paid work, should policy subsidize a carer at the time of child rearing or in 
retirement? 
• Should taxes and benefits be designed to encourage marriage? If other policy 
goals can be met only by rules that discourage marriage (for example, if 
some benefits are lost upon marriage), how much weight should be given to 
that disincentive when designing such policies?  
• How should pensions be organized for survivors or upon divorce? 
The reason for posing these questions is to make it clear that none has an unambiguous 
answer. The conclusion is that there is not—and cannot be—a single optimal policy that 
applies universally. Discussion instead considers policy options that make sense in different 
contexts, with no pretense at setting out definitive answers. 
2.2. Analytical approach 
The analysis in the paper has four centers of gravity. 
2.2.1. Multiple objectives  
Pension systems have multiple objectives that cannot all be fully achieved at the same time. 
In analytical terms, the task is to optimize across different objectives concerning marriage, 
labor supply during working years, and the distribution of consumption within the 
household and over time, including old-age economic security. The optimum will depend on 
the relative weights given to the various objectives; and since those weights reflect 
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differences in individual tastes and in social values (for example, between paid work and 
care activities), views about policy are likely to differ widely. Complicating matters is that it 
is often not clear whether a particular outcome, for example a woman forgoing paid work 
to care for young children, is the result of choice or constraint. 
2.2.2. Holistic  
As the previous paragraph suggests, it is necessary to evaluate a pension plan in the context 
of the pension system as a whole. To illustrate, an exclusive focus on consumption 
smoothing (e.g., a pure nonfinancial defined contribution [NDC] plan) suggests an 
arrangement in which benefits bear a fairly exact relationship to a worker’s accumulated 
contributions; but such a system would fail to relieve old-age poverty for low-paid workers 
and would not offer insurance against adverse labor market outcomes, both problems with 
a substantial gender element. 
Thus in what follows, some discussion is specific to the NDC design and some is relevant 
also to other designs and to other parts of the pension system. 
2.2.3. Second best  
Analysis should be couched in what economists call “second-best” terms; that is, assuming a 
world with imperfect information, incomplete markets, and distorting taxation. For 
example, the goal of minimizing (as opposed to optimizing) labor supply disincentives is 
mistaken because any pension system that includes poverty relief inescapably creates 
distortions. Thus minimizing distortions would imply little or no poverty relief—the cure 
would be worse than the disease. Pension systems can have substantial effects on behavior, 
including labor supply, saving, and the division of resources within a household. But these 
effects are not necessarily adverse; furthermore, even where they are adverse, the system 
will still raise welfare if the welfare gain from improved old-age security outweighs the costs 
of adverse incentives. In short, policy has to seek the best balance among poverty relief, 
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insurance, and containing distortions, which again will depend on the weights given to the 
different objectives. 
2.2.4. Distribution matters  
Many people (particularly non-economists) think that economics is only or mainly about 
efficiency. That view is deeply mistaken: economics has always been about equity as well as 
efficiency—indeed, one of the major thrusts of the optimal taxation literature (Diamond 
and Mirrlees 1971a, 1971b) was to integrate the two concerns.  
3. Strengthening earnings records 
Approaches to strengthening earnings records include general labor market policies to 
assist paid work (section 3.1); policies that support paid work alongside caring activities 
(section 3.2); and policies that facilitate longer working life (section 3.3). These approaches 
help to reduce the gender gap in pensions, whether DC, NDC, or defined benefit (DB). 
3.1. Labor market policies to assist paid work 
Four types of labor market policies assist paid work: 
• Equal pay for equal work. Though hugely important, this aspect of economic 
and social policy lies outside the scope of a paper on pension design. The 
policy direction is firmly noted but not discussed further. 
• Active labor market policies. These can help (usually) mothers return to the 
labor force after a period of unpaid work.  
• Labor market legislation. Labor codes can be more or less helpful in providing 
flexibility, notably in supporting part-time work. 
• Tax policy to encourage paid work by second earners. The design of personal 
income tax affects labor supply by different family members. A family base 
taxes the income of a second earner at the family’s marginal tax rate. With 
individual taxation, the marginal tax rate a person faces is independent of 
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marital status; thus the mother of young children faces lower tax rates than 
with family taxation and hence, at least via the substitution effect, is more 
likely to take paid work.  
3.2. Policies to facilitate paid work alongside caring activities 
Three sets of policy facilitate paid work alongside caring activities: 
• Sharing care-related tasks. One way to assist paid work is to share tasks more 
equally within a household (OECD 2017b). This aspect relates more to social 
change than to specific policies. In addition, a range of policies, notably those 
connected with child care, facilitate paid work in younger years. 
• The quantity and quality of child care. Prenursery children need care 
throughout the day, and school children need care outside school hours. 
Women are more likely to take paid work if child care is readily available (i.e., 
the facility has space for the child) and is available locally. Different elements 
in the solution include: 
o Enough child care facilities with good geographical coverage; 
o Closer alignment of the length of the school day with the work day, for 
example breakfast clubs and after-school clubs; and 
o Facilities that combine child care with office space (Financial Times 2017). 
• The cost of child care. Child care has to be affordable as well as available. 
Thus the extent to which child care is subsidized, either through transfers to 
the parent or through tax-financed facilities, is directly relevant. 
 
3.3. Facilitating longer working life 
Three further policies address longer working life. 
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3.3.1. Setting minimum pension age 
Though less frequent today, it remains the case that in some countries, the minimum 
pension age for women is lower than for men (OECD 2017a, Table 2.4). A lower mandatory 
retirement age unambiguously disadvantages women, in terms of both earnings 
opportunities and pension benefits, if the latter would be higher with longer work. A lower 
actual retirement age for women than men, either because retirement is mandatory or as a 
consequence of social attitudes, will reduce benefits for women in many pension 
arrangements. Also relevant is whether other rules, such as eligibility for disability benefits 
and the opportunity to contribute to tax-favored retirement accounts, are based on the 
minimum pension age. In such respects also, a lower retirement age can place some women 
at a disadvantage. 
A good design will have three features: minimum pension age will be the same for men and 
women; retirement at that age is not mandatory; and minimum pension age will be related 
to life expectancy. Box 3.1 discusses the importance of the last feature in terms of 
arrangements in Sweden. 
 
Box 3.1: Sweden: Faulty adjustment to increasing life expectancy 
Adjusting pensions to rising life expectancy requires reducing benefits at each age of 
withdrawal from the labor force. In principle this can be done by focusing on one or 
both of: 
• The level of the pension, by reducing monthly benefits at the minimum 
pension age;  
• The age at which pension is first paid, by gradually increasing the minimum 
pension age, with no compensating increase (or a less-than-actuarial 
increase) in pension.  
19 
Minimum pension age in the NDC pension in Sweden is 61 years. The benefit a 
person receives at that age is based on (i) the size of his/her accumulation, and (ii) 
the remaining life expectancy of his/her birth cohort. Thus monthly benefits go 
down as life expectancy rises. A rational response would be to work longer. 
However, lessons from behavioral economics call into question uncritical adherence 
to the assumption of rationality (Thaler and Benartzi 2004). Considerable evidence 
shows that many people retire as soon as they are allowed to do so, whether or not 
that is in their own long-run best interests or those of their dependents.  
These arguments suggest that a pension system should adjust to rising life 
expectancy in two ways, by: 
• Adjusting the level of the pension for longer life expectancy assists the 
financial sustainability of the pension system. 
• Increasing the minimum pension age broadly in line with life expectancy 
assists adequacy of benefits in cases where behavior deviates from simple 
economic rationality. 
The gender-relevance of the last point is that a later start to pension, by increasing 
the benefit, is important to preserve living standards not only at the time of 
retirement, but into older ages reached disproportionately by women. Adjusting 
minimum pension age to reflect rising life expectancy is possible (and desirable) in 
any pension design. 
3.3.2. Adjusting pension benefits for earlier or later retirement  
Whether a person retires at minimum pension age or delays taking benefits will depend 
partly on how a person’s pension is affected by a delayed start. It is desirable if someone 
with an incomplete contribution record has the option to fill some of the gaps by delaying 
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the start of benefits. Central to this element are the incentives to later retirement built into 
the pension design. 
Incentives to continue work past the minimum pension age can vary between men and 
women depending on the structure of the benefit formula and differences in the earnings 
histories of men and women. If, for example, a large jump in benefits occurs when crossing 
a threshold number of contribution years, and if more women than men are just below the 
threshold when reaching minimum pension age, the incentive to work longer will be 
stronger for women than for men.  
Good design suggests two elements to address the relation between pension benefits and 
the age at which pension is first received: 
• The pension should be larger for a worker who is older when benefits begin, 
so as to preserve incentives to work until a suitable age for stopping work.  
• Benefits should either start at a given age without requiring an end to work 
or should increase significantly for a delayed start. 
Both elements are inherent in a DC design, whether NDC or funded DC. They can (and 
should) be incorporated into other designs. 
3.3.3. Flexible retirement  
The argument for later retirement as part of the response to rising life expectancy is well 
understood. There is less understanding of the gains from more flexible retirement. Even if 
there were no concerns about sustainability, such choice is good policy for two sets of 
reasons: 
• Individuals vary widely in their preferences. Though many people retire as 
soon as they are allowed, others do not, because of the extra earnings, 
because postponing retirement raises their pension, and/or because they 
continue to enjoy working in their current job or another one. 
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• Individuals face different constraints. In the present context a particular gain 
is the possibility of improving incomplete contribution records. 
Thus pension design should seek to accommodate differences across individuals by offering 
choice over how a person moves from full-time work to full retirement (Box 3.2 illustrates 
how this is done well in the system in Sweden); and labor market policy should facilitate 
institutions that allow people to move from full-time work toward full retirement along a 
time path of their choosing. 
 
Box 3.2: Sweden: The good news: Partial pensions 
Sweden is an outlier internationally – and an example for other countries to follow – in 
allowing workers initially to draw only part of their pension. As in most countries, on 
reaching minimum pension age, workers can choose to draw all of their pension or none of 
it. In Sweden, workers also have the option to draw 25 percent, 50 percent, or 75 percent of 
their pension.6 The deferred element continues to grow; and if individuals carry on working, 
they will pay additional contributions, further increasing their eventual pension.  
This arrangement is possible with DC, NDC, and DB pensions, and should become a 
standard feature. The particular advantage for women is the options it offers to 
improve on any earlier gaps in contributions and/or years of low pay.7 
4. Redirecting resources within the pension system 
The previous section discussed ways of improving the earnings records – and hence 
contribution records – of people with caring responsibilities. In a strictly individual design a 
                                                     
6 Norway offers a similar set of options. 
7 The effects of flexible retirement are not simple. Börsch-Supan et al. (2017) find that flexible retirement 
increased the labor force participation of older workers but decreased total hours worked. 
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person accumulates pension saving that he/she draws down in retirement. Any other 
design requires an element of pooling with the pension wealth of others (addressed in this 
section) or finance from outside the pension system (section 5).  
The term “redirecting” is used because it covers the pure cases of risk sharing (e.g., 
actuarially priced individual annuities) and of redistribution (e.g., counting years spent on 
caring activities as contribution years in a DB plan), and intermediate cases. The examples 
are presented in terms of redirecting resources within the pension system, though in some 
instances they could, as an alternative, be financed from outside the pension system.  
The following categories, though not mutually exclusive, help to clarify the discussion. 
Different designs provide: 
• Pooling among individuals to cover the longevity risk (section 4.1) 
• Pooling within the family (section 4.2) 
• Pooling among pensioners (section 4.3) 
• Pooling among workers and pensioners (section 4.4). 
4.1. Pooling among individuals: Improving annuities 
A simple annuity pays a pension benefit for life: it can cover an individual or a couple, and it 
can be indexed (or not) in different ways. Key aspects concern actions on the demand and 
supply sides of the market. 
4.1.1. What requirement to annuitize?  
Annuitization insures the individual against longevity risk. A strong case exists against 
simple voluntarism. Reliance on drawdown forgoes the welfare gains of insurance, both for 
the individual and for other family members. Behavioral economics gives insights into why a 
voluntary system leads to people not annuitizing, or not annuitizing enough.  
The resulting potential ill effects are twofold: pensioners may spend too much too soon; or 
they may spend too little, either for fear of running out of money or to avoid “spending the 
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children’s inheritance.” Such tendencies do not imply that mandatory full annuitization is 
optimal. Uncertainty about future expenditures and bequest motives both imply that not all 
wealth should be annuitized (Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond 2005). Some countries have a 
requirement to annuitize, but also an option for workers to take part of their accumulation 
as a lump sum when first drawing pension.8  
4.1.2. The supply of annuities  
Insurance can cope with risk (where the probability is known) but not with uncertainty 
(where it is not). In principle, annuities are priced on the basis of the expected remaining 
lifetime of the annuitant, which is treated as a risk. That model may have been appropriate 
when the gap between typical retirement age and life expectancy was small (e.g., five 
years). Today, however, many people retire in their early 60s and may live for another 30 
years. Thus retirements are typically much longer than in the past; as a result, the “funnel of 
doubt” about remaining life expectancy at the time a person retires is large. It can therefore 
be argued that life expectancy is not a simple risk but has a significant element of 
uncertainty.  
Various ways exist to address the supply-side problem, including variable annuities (in 
which the annuity adjusts from year to year reflecting changes in life expectancy of the 
cohort of annuitants, and perhaps also financial market outcomes). That approach shares 
risks among annuitants. Other approaches share risk more widely, of which two stand out. 
Governments, unlike private insurers, can raise income from sources other than insurance 
premiums; in addition, governments can change contractual arrangements (e.g., raising 
state pension age) in ways that have democratic legitimacy – forms of adjustment that are 
not available to private insurers. Thus one way to address uncertainty is for the government 
to be the annuity provider. This is the approach in Sweden. 
                                                     
8 In the United Kingdom, workers used to be required to convert at least 75 percent of their accumulation into 
an annuity, so could take up to 25 percent as a (tax-free) lump sum. The rules were recently relaxed. 
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A private sector solution would be through longevity bonds. Suppose that official figures 
underestimate increases in life expectancy, leading to losses by annuity providers who 
therefore either leave the market or price future annuities conservatively. One way to 
address the problem is for government to sell longevity bonds. In this arrangement, in (say) 
2020, an insurance company would sell an annuity to an individual aged (say) 70 priced on 
official estimates of the remaining life expectancy of a 70-year-old person in 2020. If the 
cohort of annuitants lives longer than the 2020 projection the taxpayer finances the 
resulting extra cost. Thus the insurance company takes on the risk, the taxpayer the 
uncertainty. This is a sensible division of labor. The role of government is to fill the missing 
market.9 
4.1.3. What role for deferred annuities?  
Persons without an annuity must draw down their pension savings, with the risk of spending 
too much too soon or too little too late. One approach is a rule-of-thumb for drawdown. In 
the United States, for example, there are tax penalties for drawing down too little and too 
much.10  
In principle, a useful approach is to combine drawdown with a deferred annuity – i.e., an 
annuity bought at (say) age 65 that pays an annual benefit for life from age 85. That 
arrangement could be voluntary, or there could be a nudge or mandate. In practice, the 
market for deferred annuities is thin. But such an instrument would be useful both to allow 
drawdown over a known period (i.e., from retirement until the start date of the deferred 
annuity) and to protect against old-age poverty. Where such an annuity is joint-life 
(discussed next), it also protects elderly survivors, disproportionately widows. 
                                                     
9 For fuller discussion, see Thomsen and Verner Andersen (2007) and Blake, Boardman, and Cairns (2010). 
10 Individuals are required to withdraw the Required Minimum Distribution (RMD) from age 70½. Failure to do 
so incurs a tax penalty of 50 percent of the shortfall, i.e., if the RMD is US$50,000 someone who withdraws 
only US$30,000 faces a tax penalty of US$10,000. See https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/retirement-plans-
faqs-regarding-required-minimum-distributions#8  
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4.2. Pooling within the family 
As noted earlier, personal income tax poses the question of whether to think of the 
individual or the family as the economic unit for policy design. The same is true for pension 
systems. Should a person in a rich family with low earnings or low pension benefits be 
eligible for the same redistribution as someone with similar earnings or benefits in a poor 
family, or on their own? Many people would say no, but a complicating factor is that family 
structures have become more fluid: more than in the past, family at the time when pension 
starts may be different from family at the time when its members worked and made 
pension contributions. And divorce settlements may or may not have taken into account 
future pension benefits.  
Organizing pensions on an individual rather than a family basis, with women having 
pensions only in their own right, is argued by some to be a better fit for societies with such 
fluidity. On the other hand, as with income tax, family structure affects available resources 
and the demands on those resources.  
Pooling within the family has at least three aspects: sharing pension pots during working 
life; survivors’ pensions; and accommodating divorce. 
4.2.1. Sharing pension pots year by year during working life  
Consider a couple where the husband has a record of continuous high-earning employment, 
and the wife one of low earnings and a low contribution density. Thus the husband has a 
large pension and the wife a small one. Where a couple (i) stays married throughout 
working life and retirement, (ii) does not differ greatly in age, and (iii) shares income 
amicably, this arrangement might be a useful rule of thumb. However, a case can be made 
for giving couples some flexibility over the division of pension capital. The issue is 
particularly relevant where a couple divorces during working life.  
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A minimal approach is to allow pension entitlements to be shared on a voluntary basis. A 
more radical option (Barr 2001, 150) is to require that half of a husband’s contribution goes 
into his wife’s accumulation and vice versa. The argument for doing so is that caring for 
children (or elderly dependents) has costs, and those costs have to fall somewhere. Pooling 
pension pots means that the costs of child rearing in terms of forgone pensions is shared 
between parents. These accounts belong to the individual and would be carried through a 
divorce. Against these advantages, however, is the problem that arises when the ages of 
husband and wife are significantly different and they have had very different earnings, and 
the higher earner is older. In such a case, dividing pension assets undercuts their ability to 
finance the couple’s retirement if they remain married. This is clearest in the case of a one-
earner couple. When the worker reaches retirement age, only half of the benefit is available 
until the younger spouse has reached retirement age.  
4.2.2. Survivors’ pensions  
The specific question is whether pension design should allow, encourage, or mandate joint-
life annuitization. The main argument for joint-life annuitization of at least of a part of a 
worker’s pension is to prevent poverty for the surviving spouse, most often the wife. The 
root of such poverty is twofold:  
• Economies of scale arise in household formation. A single survivor of a 
couple typically needs about 65–70 percent of the couple’s income to 
maintain a broadly constant standard of living. If spouses are the same age 
and have identical earnings histories and identical pension benefits, the 
death of one may lower the living standard of the other. This is part of the 
reason why poverty is more frequent among widows than among married 
elderly women.11  
                                                     
11 Although the paper discusses surviving spouses, a well-designed system also has benefits for young 
survivors, notably young children.  
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• In addition, as discussed, women on average have lower earnings and/or a 
lower contribution density than men.  
While social policy can help to address the second reason, the first is inherent.  
For both reasons, survivors’ pensions are important for preserving the living standards of 
the elderly. Several ways of organizing such benefits are available. A worker’s accumulation 
could be used to buy a joint-life annuity with a suitable fraction (50 percent is common) for 
the survivor, based on the actuarial conversion of a single-life annuity into the relevant 
joint-life annuity. In a two-earner couple this could be done by both partners. 
Mandatory joint-life annuitization can create winners and losers because:  
• Life expectancy at a given age is generally lower among lower earners than 
higher earners (OECD 2017c); thus standard annuity pricing – whether single- 
or joint-life – redistributes from poorer to richer people.  
• In some systems, survivors’ benefits do not adjust for the age difference 
between spouses, redistributing from couples of similar age to ones with a 
large difference.  
If joint-life annuitization is voluntary, the potential issue is adverse selection: couples who 
think that, even having adjusted for the age difference between spouses, one will live 
considerably longer than the other are more likely to purchase such annuities. 
A DB system could offer a similar set of options, based on the actuarial conversion of a 
single-life annuity into the relevant joint-life annuity. Alternatively, survivors’ benefits could 
be provided out of the revenues of the pension system as a whole. 
Different designs give different degrees of “nudge.” Joint-life annuitization could be 
voluntary, or could be the default, or could be a stronger default by requiring both partners 
to agree in writing that the default should be replaced by a single-life annuity for the 
worker. Alternatively, joint-life annuitization could be mandatory. Sweden is an outlier 
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internationally in ruling out joint-life annuitization in the NDC pension, an arrangement 
assessed in Box 4.1. 
The main conclusion is that there are powerful arguments against organizing pension 
benefits – whether NDC or other designs – on a strictly individual basis. 
 
Box 4.1: Survivors’ pensions in Sweden 
Unusually, the NDC pension in Sweden:  
Does not allow transfers of notional capital between spouses and registered partners, either 
during a marriage or upon divorce; and  
Has no option for joint-life annuities. When (as is more usually the case) the husband dies, 
his NDC pension dies with him.12 
The argument in Sweden for this design is that either arrangement would violate gender 
equity if it discouraged married women’s labor supply – the more generous the survivors’ 
benefits, the more powerful the disincentive. The issue is important because the gender pay 
gap persists, and gender equality is elusive even in Sweden (OECD 2018).  
However, several counterarguments are that: 
In efficiency terms, the design places heavy emphasis on first-best rationality, i.e., that the 
prospect of a low pension in the future will increase a woman’s labor supply in the present. 
It implies that the costs of parenting should fall on women in old age to the extent that a 
woman earns less than her husband. Many would dispute this value judgement, both 
directly, and particularly if the reason she earns less is forgone career opportunities because 
                                                     
12 The fully funded premium pension in Sweden allows joint-life annuities, but with no requirement or nudge. 
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of caring activities. 
It ignores the reality, noted above, that a couple is not in all respects the same thing as two 
single individuals. 
It takes insufficient account of changes in family structure, in particular that divorce is more 
common than in the past. 
The Swedish design is not an inherent part of the NDC design; joint-life annuities are 
possible in NDC plans, as in funded DC plans and DB plans. 
4.2.3. Divorce  
Divorce is common and, if there is no adjustment, divorce after many years of marriage can 
result in very low benefits for a person with a limited earnings history. Poverty rates for 
elderly divorced women who do not remarry are high in the United States.13  
Thus there are rules, often involving the courts, about the division of accumulated assets 
(sometimes including human capital) of a couple upon divorce, with particular focus on 
accumulations during the marriage.  
Different strategies are used to provide benefits after a divorce, implemented through 
decisions at the time of retirement or at the time of divorce. One strategy is to provide 
benefits when a divorced person reaches retirement age. This can be done as a transfer of 
benefits between spouses. For example, when a worker starts to draw a pension, benefits 
are adjusted to provide some benefits not only to a current spouse, but also to previous 
spouses, using a formula relating to the lengths and timing of the marriages. Future 
availability of such benefits could be factored into a divorce agreement. Alternatively, 
                                                     
13 In 2014, the poverty rate in the United States was 4.9 percent for married women over 65. The comparable 
figures for widows and divorced women were 16.3 percent and 18.4 percent, respectively – see 
https://www.ssa.gov/retirementpolicy/fact-sheets/marital-status-poverty.html.  
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benefits for a divorced spouse could be financed from the resources of the pension system 
generally, without reducing the benefit of the worker entitled to the pension, as in the 
United States.  
A second strategic approach is to transfer pension wealth between spouses at the time of a 
divorce, based on their earnings records during the marriage. With a funded DC plan the 
actual assets are divided; in an NDC plan it is the notional capital. Such transfers are also 
possible in a DB plan. For example, in Canada, when a marriage or common-law partnership 
ends, the entitlements to the Canada Pension Plan built up by the couple during the time 
they lived together may be divided equally between them as part of a divorce settlement.  
A third approach, discussed earlier, is to divide earnings records on an annual basis during 
the marriage, for example with individual accounts, where each year the earnings of 
husband and wife are divided between them.  
4.3. Pooling among pensioners 
Resources can be pooled more widely than only within families. Two main approaches are 
discussed.  
4.3.1. Gender-specific or joint mortality tables 
Governments can provide annuities based on a single mortality table for men and women in 
a given birth cohort, or require that private providers do so. As a result, a man and a woman 
with the same accumulation and retiring at the same age receive the same monthly pension. 
However, with a single mortality table, men on average receive less in present value terms 
per dollar of accumulation than women because of their lower average life expectancy.  
Alternatively, governments may allow pension providers to base annuities on gender-specific 
mortality tables. Given different life expectancies, a man and woman with the same 
accumulation and retiring at the same age would receive different monthly pensions, the 
man receiving a larger one. This practice is outlawed in employer-organized systems in the 
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United States and the European Union, and many countries require joint mortality tables not 
only for the mandatory system but also for voluntary pensions.  
Joint mortality tables, however, are not the end of the story. Since higher earners tend to 
live longer than lower earners of the same gender, uniform pricing tends to benefit them; 
additionally, market pricing will reflect administrative costs, so that people with higher 
benefits may get better pricing. Since men on average have higher earnings, such outcomes 
have a gender effect even in a system that mandates joint mortality tables. 
4.3.2. Indexing pensions in payment  
Once a pension is awarded it can be increased each year in line with prices, wages, or a 
combination, raising another set of issues (Barr and Diamond 2008, section 5.3.4). 
For a given initial pension, the more rapidly benefits grow, the more expensive the system; 
the less rapidly they grow, the further pensioners fall behind average living standards over 
time. Thus price indexation places greater emphasis on containing costs and preserving 
purchasing power, and wage indexation greater emphasis on the relative adequacy of 
benefits. Pension design needs to strike a balance between these two aspects.  
At a given long-run cost, a tradeoff arises between the initial level of pensions and the 
subsequent rate of growth of benefits: the more rapidly benefits grow, the lower it is 
necessary to set the initial benefit. This is the way that initial benefits are determined in a 
system with annuities in funded DC systems and in the calculation of initial benefits in the 
NDC system in Sweden.  
Since workers differ in life expectancy, different combinations of initial benefit levels and 
growth rates of benefit with the same aggregate long-run cost will affect different workers 
differently:  
• A worker with a shorter expected life will prefer higher initial benefits with 
slower subsequent growth.  
32 
• Within each gender, people with higher earnings tend to live longer; thus the 
choice of growth rate of benefits has important ex ante distributional effects.  
• On average women live longer than men, thus there is also a gender issue.  
To illustrate, at a given long-run cost, price indexation generates a higher initial pension, 
benefitting people with shorter lives, but exposing elderly pensioners (typically widows) to 
being left further and further behind. With wage indexation, the reverse occurs. 
4.4. Pooling among workers and pensioners  
Pooling among workers and pensioners can take place in four ways. 
4.4.1. Less stringent contribution requirements 
A DB plan can cover gaps in the contributions of some workers from the contributions of 
other workers. Some countries give no benefit unless a person has contributed for at least a 
minimum number of years, while others provide benefits after any contribution. Since 
women on average contribute for fewer years than men, the latter approach tends to 
provide at least some pension for more women. For the same reason, a smaller number of 
years of contributions necessary to qualify for a full benefit tends to help second earners. 
Pension credits are a particular example of this approach. In a DB plan, years spent in caring 
activities could be included as contribution years, with caring-related gaps financed from the 
contributions of other workers. As discussed shortly, in a DC plan, tax-financed contributions 
could be paid on behalf of the carer. In an NDC plan, such contributions could be notional 
(i.e., financed from within the NDC plan) or real (i.e., involving outside finance) (Chłoń-
Domińczak, Franco, and Palmer 2012).  
Three other forms of pooling, though with no specific gender aspects, benefit women by 
assisting the adequacy and sustainability of the pension system.  
4.4.2. Minimum pension age 
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Earlier discussion pointed to several conclusions: that minimum pension age should be the 
same for men and women, and that retirement at that age should not be mandatory. A third 
issue is how minimum pension age adjusts to rising life expectancy. 
In a DC or an NDC plan, pension benefits decline automatically as life expectancy rises. In 
such a plan the purpose of raising minimum pension age is to protect the adequacy of 
benefits rather than the economic sustainability of the plan. In a DB plan with a given 
pension age, rising life expectancy leads to increasing costs and hence problems of 
sustainability. Raising minimum pension age with no compensating increase in monthly 
pension benefits is a way of pooling the longevity risk between workers and pensioners, 
given the tradeoff between higher contributions and a higher minimum pension age. 
4.4.3. Pooling across workers and pensioners: Collective DC pensions  
The Netherlands has funded industry pension plans. The system is evolving but in broad 
terms offers workers a career-average benefit, but (i) contingent on fund performance, and 
(ii) with a cap on the employer contribution rate. The combination of a career-average 
design with solvency-contingent indexing of liabilities results in a plan that is a hybrid of DB 
and DC.  
A collective arrangement of this sort has advantages. Collective risk pooling offers wider risk 
sharing than an individual plan. As an example:  
“[I]f a cohort lives longer than expected, the resulting lower funding rate 
harms the indexation of the deferred annuities offered to younger cohorts. 
Moreover, by linking pension benefits to the wages of workers, pension 
funds allow retirees to share in the wage risks of workers” (Bovenberg and 
Gradus 2014, 6). 
 
4.4.4. Pooling across workers and pensioners: Accrual in an NDC plan  
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Suppose that the stock market crashes. The annuity that a worker invested in the stock 
market will buy will fall correspondingly (if the value of an accumulation falls from 100 to 75, 
so will the resulting annuity). An NDC plan can spread that risk more widely because accrual 
works differently.  
In an NDC plan a person’s pension wealth is crystallized year by year. Thus, as Box 4.2 
explains, an economic crisis late in a person's career has a smaller effect than with fully 
funded individual accounts. 
 
Box 4.2: Accrual in an NDC plan shares risk 
In contrast with a fully funded DC system, a person’s pension wealth in an NDC plan is 
crystallized year by year. More specifically, in my first year in the labor force, my 
contribution, C1 = tY1, where t is the contribution rate and Y1 my earnings in year 1. C1 then 
earns a notional return, r1; and C1 (1+r1) earns a notional return r2 in year 2, etc. In a good 
year, r will be higher and vice versa. Thus in year 1, I earn a “slice” of my pension. Ditto in 
year 2, etc., so that when I retire, my pension is the sum of those “slices,” not unlike a 
career-average DB plan. If a major crisis strikes in year n, the effect is mainly via the accrual 
rate on the flow of new contributions and the indexation of benefits in payment rather than 
on the value of the stock of notional assets.  
Thus the NDC design gives pensioners more protection than fully funded individual accounts 
by sharing risk more widely. Adjustment to protect previously accumulated “slices” does 
not fall entirely on pensioners (as in a pure DC plan) but is shared between pensioners and 
workers. Thus the calculation of the “slice” each year is on a DC basis, but its preservation is 
more like a DB system.  
 
5. Adding resources from outside the pension system 
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Old-age security is affected by institutions outside the pension system in many ways. This 
section outlines four: supporting contribution records during working life; subsidizing 
pensions in payment; noncontributory pensions; and the role of insurance, particularly to 
cover age-related risks. 
5.1. Supporting contribution records during working life  
In a DC plan, the contributions of someone not in paid work because of caring activities can 
be paid year by year on (more usually) her behalf by taxpayers. The pension contributions of 
low earners could similarly be supplemented (the DC plan in Mexico incorporates a taxpayer 
subsidy that declines as earnings rise and is fully tapered away for high earners (OECD 2015, 
306)). An NDC plan has analogous options. 
5.2. Subsidizing pensions in payment  
Pensions in payment can also be subsidized by the taxpayer, for example paying a full benefit 
on the basis of a combination of contributions and pension credits. That arrangement is 
possible with DC plans (e.g., cover for maternity in Chile), in NDC arrangements (e.g., a 
minimum pension guarantee), and in DB plans. 
5.3. Noncontributory benefits  
A noncontributory pension is awarded on the basis of a test of age and residence, but 
without a contributions test. The benefit can be awarded on the basis only of age and 
residence, as in the Netherlands and New Zealand, or could be subject also to an income or 
assets test.  
Since women on average have lower contribution densities and often smaller contributions, 
a noncontributory pension has a particular benefit for them. A reinforcing design would 
provide a higher basic pension for a single person than for a member of a couple, helping to 
preserve the replacement rate of the surviving partner. 
36 
The existence or otherwise of benefits financed from outside the pension system has a 
fundamental bearing on gender equity. To illustrate with an extreme example, if there was a 
Europe-wide noncontributory pension of €1 million per year for each elderly person 
irrespective of marital status, this paper would be much less salient.  
5.4. Good insurance  
The more comprehensive a country’s insurance to cover the costs of medical care and long-
term care, the less the need for precautionary saving, hence the greater the fraction of 
pension wealth that can be converted into an annuity. The general point is that greater 
support from noncontributory sources and better insurance against risks faced 
disproportionately by older people are a powerful separate source of gender equity in old 
age, illustrating the point made early in the paper of the importance of thinking about 
pension systems holistically. 
 
6. Conclusion 
6.1. Balancing multiple objectives  
This section returns to some of the questions listed earlier. 
6.1.1. Who should bear the costs of child-rearing, and when?  
Should society assist with the costs of child rearing and, if so, should it do so at the time of 
caring or in retirement? Different ways of recognizing care activities have different 
distributional and incentive effects. One approach is to credit a person’s pension record 
with a fixed amount for each year that he/she provides care, as in the NDC plans in Sweden 
and Poland. Sweden also credits a caregiver’s individual funded account. Thus her pension is 
larger because of additional deposits into her account, paid out of general revenue.  
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In some countries pensions are based on career-average earnings, typically incorporating 
people’s highest earning years. In this case a uniform level of credit per year of child care 
raises the pension of someone with a short career or sufficiently low earnings, while 
offering less (or no) help to someone with a long career and high earnings.  
In other countries, years spent in caregiving may be dropped from the calculation, thus 
reducing the number of years used in calculating career-average earnings. With an earnings-
related pension, this approach implicitly credits a higher-earning woman with a larger 
amount than a lower-earning woman.14  
These different approaches also have different implications for finance: with a fully funded 
or NDC plan, the cost of a pension credit has to be met at the time that the credit is earned; 
in a DB plan, the cost can be left until the pension is paid. 
A broader question is whether pension credits for caregiving are good policy. The credit is a 
blunt instrument that does not distinguish between cases where labor supply is affected by 
the credit and where it is not. A parent in a well-off household may have no paid work, and 
hence be eligible for a credit, but also employ a full-time nanny. That is, a pension credit 
does not distinguish between those who look after the children themselves and those who 
do not.  
The underlying question is whether support for child rearing should be backloaded by 
supporting the carer’s future pension or frontloaded with support at the time of caring. The 
latter type of support can include child benefit and/or subsidies for child care. The choice of 
                                                     
14 To see this, suppose a pension is normally based on a person’s 40 highest earnings years. For someone who 
has 30 years of earnings and spent 10 years caring for children, the average will be based on those 30 years of 
highest earnings, with the next-highest 10 years of earnings dropping out of the calculation. Thus those 10 
years are credited with the average of the highest-earning 30 years rather than zero. This is worth more to a 
woman with higher earnings in those 30 years than to one with lower earnings. For women with more than 30 
years of positive earnings, the gain depends on earnings in the highest-earning 30 years relative to earnings in 
lower years. 
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balance between support at different stages in the lifecycle is to a considerable extent a 
matter of social values and politics, and hence a matter for each country to decide.  
6.1.2. To what extent should paid work be encouraged?  
Decisions about old-age security need to be considered alongside policy preferences about 
the balance between paid work and caring for children. The fact that some designs 
encourage paid work does not mean that paid work should necessarily be maximized. A 
central policy question is the balance between encouraging paid work on the one hand, and 
encouraging caring in the home on the other. The issue is controversial because answers 
depend both on social values and on hard-to-measure empirical magnitudes, such as the 
benefits of parenting and whether a stay-at-home carer does so out of choice or constraint. 
Incentives to take paid work are stronger where subsidies for child care are conditioned on 
the caregiver being in paid work, and where taxation of secondary earners15 is lower. 
Incentives to take paid work are weaker where caregiving is recognized through a pension 
credit. In contrast, a child benefit paid independent of work (as is typical) has an income 
effect on labor supply but no substitution effect.16  
The relative sizes of these elements determine the balance of incentives between paid work 
and caregiving. For example: 
• The incentive to stay at home to care for children can be strengthened by 
making child benefits or pension credits, or both, available only to people 
with no (or little) earnings. 
• To strengthen the incentive to take paid work, a subsidy for child care could 
be conditioned on working at least a minimum number of hours. Such a 
                                                     
15 The secondary earner is the spouse with the lower earnings. 
16 By increasing parental income, the child benefit reduces the incentive to take paid work; however, the 
benefit has no effect on the net return to additional work, and thus creates no disincentive via the substitution 
effect.  
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subsidy encourages (i) the use of paid child care by those who earn income, 
and therefore (ii) the willingness to accept work. 
• It is possible to separate the incentive to work from the incentive to use paid 
child care by changing the balance between (i) the child care subsidy, and (ii) 
lower taxes or higher pension credits for those working. Design can make 
part-time work more or less attractive relative to full-time work. 
6.1.3. What should be the relative treatment of different types of families?  
The balance between different instruments has distributional effects that are diverse and 
complex. A greater emphasis on pension credits or child benefits assists families with 
children relative to those without. A greater emphasis on lower taxation of secondary 
earnings benefits couples with children relative to single parents. Unless the lower taxation 
of secondary earnings is available only to those with small children, it does not match a 
pension credit. And a pension credit does not perfectly match a child care subsidy, since use 
of child care is not universal among those who work.  
Potential distributional effects also arise between better- and worse-off families. For 
example, if pension credits go primarily to members of high-earning families (perhaps 
because they are the most likely to be able to afford to have someone not in paid work), the 
situation is very different from one where the credit goes primarily to low-income single 
parents, who would otherwise have very small pensions. Thus the case for a pension credit 
needs to be evaluated with a focus on who receives it and on the extent to which that fits 
policy makers’ distributional objectives.  
6.2. Central conclusions 
This paper put forward three sets of arguments about gender and family issues in pension 
design: 
• No unambiguously best design exists, but some designs are unambiguously 
bad. 
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• Policy should not focus only on the design of the pension system but should 
recognize the impact on eventual pension benefits of other policies, for 
example the taxation of earnings, subsidies for child care, all-day schools, 
and regulations about flexibility of work for parents of young children.  
• The argument is not that women ought to work or ought to care for children; 
rather it is that tax and pension systems (and other policies) inevitably create 
incentives that affect decisions about paid work, care activities, and leisure 
and therefore should be chosen to reflect social values and individual 
preferences and constraints, all of which will differ within and across 
countries.  
More concretely, pension design needs to be sensitive to the differing impacts on men and 
women. To that end it should: 
• Consider what recognition is appropriate, and in what form, of years spent in 
socially valued activities such as caring for children, disabled people, and 
elderly dependents, balancing such recognition with incentives to participate 
in paid work. 
• Set common rules for pension eligibility and determination. 
• Require the use of joint life tables if the system includes mandatory 
annuitization. 
• Ensure that satisfactory pension arrangements are in place for surviving 
spouses and after a divorce. 
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